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Abstract
This study examines the differences and commonalities of how populist parties of the left and right relate to democracy.
The focus is narrowed to the relationship between these parties and two aspects of democratic quality, minority rights and
mutual constraints. Our argument is twofold: first, we contend that populist parties can exert distinct influences on minor-
ity rights, depending on whether they are left-wing or right-wing populist parties. Second, by contrast, we propose that
the association between populist parties andmutual constraints is a consequence of the populist element and thus, we ex-
pect no differences between the left-wing and right-wing parties. We test our expectations against data from 30 European
countries between 1990 and 2012. Our empirical findings support the argument for the proposed differences regarding
minority rights and, to a lesser extent, the proposed similarities regarding mutual constraints. Therefore we conclude that,
when examining the relationship between populism and democracy, populism should not be considered in isolation from
its host ideology.
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1. Introduction
Populist actors around the world have gradually evolved
into influential political forces in various countries and
regions. Independent of the region, they share the ideas
of anti-elitism and people centrism. On this basis, they
can challenge common democratic rules, including those
of liberal democracy (Plattner, 2010), according to which
powermust be restrained and individual rights protected.
Through the populist lens, features of liberal democ-
racy, such as systems of checks and balances, undermine
the proper implementation of the general will, which
they claim to be the only true representative of. Thus,
their presence can have a negative impact on the quality
of democracy if populist parties challenge these institu-
tions, particularly when they are in government (Alber-
tazzi & Mueller, 2013).
Populist parties, however, are not only characterized
by their populist element but also by their host ideology
(Mudde, 2004). Thus, they can take the form of right-
wing populist parties (Mudde, 2007), left-wing populist
parties (March, 2011), or centrist populist parties (Havlík
& Stanley, 2015). In other words, populist parties dif-
fer on a wide-ranging set of issues such as the promo-
tion of exclusive (right-wing populist parties) or inclusive
(left-wing populist parties) societies (Mudde & Rovira
Kaltwasser, 2013). These differences have been shown
to manifest themselves in the behavior of populist par-
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ties, for instance with regards to parliamentary voting
where the populist element plays little to no role (Otjes &
Louwerse, 2015). Despite these well-known differences,
however, there is little debate in the literature about
whether the postulated relationship between populist
parties and democracy is a function of their host ideol-
ogy, their populist element, or both. This article seeks to
fill this void, taking as its starting point the discussion be-
tween populism and liberal democracy (Mudde & Rovira
Kaltwasser, 2012).
We adopt the proposition that the host ideology, like
the populist element, is central to the actions that par-
ties take. We argue that the role of ideology is essen-
tial to understandingwhy populist parties of varying host
ideologies relate differently to subdimensions of liberal
democracy, namely political inclusion (minority rights)
and mutual constraints. Focusing on left-wing and right-
wing populist parties, we anticipate the host ideology to
be the deciding factor for how these parties relate to the
dimension of political inclusion. In comparison to right-
wing populist parties, we expect left-wing populist par-
ties to be associated withmore positive effects onminor-
ity rights. For the second dimension, mutual constraints,
we expect the populist element to play the central role
and in consequence, expect no differences in associa-
tions between populist parties of different host ideology.
Empirically, we test our propositions against data
from 30 European countries from 1990 to 2012. This
dataset, although limited to one region, allows us to test
our arguments for a diverse set of populist parties. The
results lend support to our argument that host ideologies
matter for how certain populist parties relate to democ-
racy and liberal democracy in particular as differences in
effects of left and right-wing populists occur for minor-
ity rights. At the same time, the results do not suggest a
strong association between populist parties and mutual
constraints. Therefore, this study highlights the need to
investigate subdimensions of (liberal) democracy (Houle
& Kenny, 2016; Immerzeel & Pickup, 2015) to generate
a better understanding of the complex relationship be-
tween populist parties and democracy.
2. Populism and (Liberal) Democracy
Following the ideational approach (Hawkins, 2009), pop-
ulism constitutes a set of ideas. Despite varying defi-
nitions that can be subsumed under the ideational ap-
proach,most studies consider at least four attributes cen-
tral to populism: people centrism, the perception of the
people as a homogenous entity with a general will, anti-
elitism, and thedepiction of a permanent crisis (Rooduijn,
2014). Mudde (2004, p. 543; italics original) summarizes
the central attributes in his widely referenced minimal
definition of populism, which we draw on in this arti-
cle, calling populism a thin-centered “ideology that con-
siders society to be ultimately separated into two homo-
geneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and
‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should
be an expression of volonté générale (general will) of
the people”. The view of populism as an ideological con-
struct, however, remains at the center of many debates.
Another large branch in the literature, for instance, dis-
cusses populism as a discourse (or frame) (e.g., Aslanidis,
2016, 2017; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). However, even
among those that speak of populism as a discourse, some
acknowledge that populists ultimately may implement
their idea of politics as an expression of the general will
(Müller, 2016). Furthermore, both branches in the litera-
ture share the view that populism can appear across the
ideological spectrum giving populism its chameleon char-
acteristic (Taggart, 2000). In the ideological approach, for
instance, populism as a thin-ideology is said to attach it-
self to different host ideologies (Stanley, 2008).
Because “populism indirectly questions the procedu-
ral minimum that lies at the heart of our current defi-
nitions of democracy” (Hawkins, 2010, p. 37), scholars
using different conceptualizations discuss the relation-
ship between populism and (certain forms of) democ-
racy. Most notably, they focus on how populism re-
lates to democracy in general (Müller, 2016), represen-
tative democracy (Canovan, 1999), and liberal democ-
racy (Kriesi, 2014;Mudde&Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012; Plat-
tner, 2010). These studies share a focus on populism’s
homogenous view of society in which the common will
of the people is to be articulated in an unmediated way
and implemented without any restrictions (Caramani,
2017).1 Perhaps for this reason, there has been a recent
focus on populism and the quality of liberal democracy
(cf. Huber & Schimpf, 2016a, 2017; Pappas, 2014, 2016).
After all, the essence of liberal democracy is that power
can never be absolute as it is characterized by “the intrin-
sic importance of transparency, civil liberty, the rule of
law, horizontal accountability (effective checks on rulers),
and minority rights” (Coppedge et al., 2011, p. 253).2 Mi-
nority rights and horizontal accountability in particular
are two features of liberal democracy that run counter
to the populist understanding of how democracy ought
to function. Populist actors depict a homogenous soci-
ety (the people) and highlight the necessity for politics
to follow the general will without any unnecessary re-
strictions, implemented by the populists themselves as
the only true representatives of the people.3 Therefore,
some scholars argue that populist actors can have a neg-
ative impact on democracy, and in particular, on liberal
1 In contrast to extremist parties, radical populist parties are not considered anti-constitutional per se (Mudde, 2007; Rensmann, 2006) although they
present the system they operate in as “undemocratic” (Abts & Rummens, 2007).
2 Democratic quality in this case refers to the degree—and not the existence—of these criteria, that is, how well standards for aspects such as trans-
parency, legality, and good governance are implemented (Beetham, 2004; Diamond & Morlino, 2005).
3 For this reason, too, Canovan (1999) argues that populism is at odds with representative democracy in which institutions mediate any societal conflicts.
Populist actors, however, consider society to be homogenous to begin with and also, may argue in favor of a more direct form of politics (but seeMüller,
2016, p. 29 for a different view).
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democracy (e.g. Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012; Ruth,
2017). For as long as populists are not in power, they
are rarely in a position to implement their ideas. Instead,
they may even have a corrective function as they high-
light institutional shortcomings (e.g. Müller, 2002), mobi-
lize otherwise unrepresented groups of voters (e.g. Han-
ley, 2012), and articulate issues or protest (e.g. de Lange
& Akkerman, 2012).4
From this debate, we can derive the expectation
that populist actors may have positive side effects but
generally, relate negatively to (liberal) democratic qual-
ity, in particular when they are in government (Alber-
tazzi & Mueller, 2013). Here, their presence can result in
changes or even the erosion of important components
such as the system of checks and balances, as can be
seen in countries governed by populist parties, such as
contemporary Poland (Markowski, 2016) and Hungary
(Batory, 2016). However, the argument hinges on the
assumption that all populist actors must share a simi-
lar understanding of a homogenous society whose gen-
eral will functions as the guiding principle for political
decisions and shall not be infringed by unnecessary in-
stitutional boundaries. In this scenario, the people con-
stitute the sovereign. Yet Mény and Surel (2002) iden-
tify two further conceptions of the people, namely the
people as a nation (cultural) and the people as a class
(economic). Both are linked to specific forms of pop-
ulism, the former to right-wing populism and the latter
to left-wing populism (Kriesi, 2014, p. 362). Studies that
compare these two types of populist parties find that
their behavior, such as their parliamentary voting behav-
ior (Otjes & Louwerse, 2015) for instance, differs as a
consequence of the host ideology. The questions that
arise then are: which of the two elements, host ideology
or populism, determines the relationship between pop-
ulism and liberal-democracy? And, does this relationship
play out differently depending on the subdimensions of
liberal democracy? In what follows, we discuss the dif-
ferences between left- and right-wing populism in detail.
We focus on two aspects of liberal democracy, minority
rights and mutual constraints, to highlight possible com-
monalities and differences in the relationships between
populist parties and democracy.
3. Populism Left, Right, and Center: Differences and
Commonalities
Populist parties, independent of their host ideology, are
united in their critique against the political establishment
(Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017). Yet, it is the host ideology
that determines against whom the people should rally
(Katsambekis, 2017, p. 205). Left-wing populist parties
define the people on a class basis, referring mostly to the
poor. In contrast, right-wing populist parties define the
people on a cultural, nativist base (March, 2011; Mudde,
2004). In other words, whereas left-wing populist par-
ties frame their criticisms economically and seek to pro-
tect the proletariat from exploitation by capitalists, right-
wing populist parties champion nativism (Mudde, 2007,
p. 19) and seek to protect “the nation from dangerous
others” (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017, p. 196), stressing
cultural issues above the rest. Thus, left-wing populist
parties differ from right-wing populist parties in that they
embrace an inclusive as opposed to an exclusive view of
society (Katsambekis, 2017; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser,
2013).5 More importantly though, despite left-wing pop-
ulist being inclusive on the society level, this does not
necessarily imply that they are not anti-pluralistic on the
political level. Essentially, the question of how democ-
racy is organized is political and differences between left-
wing and right-wing populism can be illustrated focus-
ing on central aspects of democracy, namely political
inclusion and political contestation (Dahl, 1971). While
left-wing populist parties generally neither discredit mi-
nority groups nor object to granting these groups polit-
ical rights, they do not accept political competition for
that they, and only they, are the true representatives
of the people. Consequently, they consider political con-
trol through effective opposition and institutional power
check mechanisms as obstacles that prevent them from
implementing the people’s will. In this sense, left-wing
populists are inclusive on the society level and the dimen-
sion of political participation. Yet, they are exclusive and
essentially anti-pluralistic with regards to public contes-
tation and the control of power (Mudde & Rovira Kalt-
wasser, 2013, p. 162). In contrast, right-wing populist par-
ties are generally exclusive with regards to all of these as-
pects for that they object the extension of political partic-
ipation rights to minorities in addition to claiming to be
the only true representatives of what they consider to be
the people. In short, left- and right-wing populism differ
with regards to political inclusion but share similarities in
their ideas of political contestation and control of power.
It is for this reason that we choose two subdimensions of
liberal democracy to highlight differences and common-
alities between left- and right-wing populism, minority
rights and mutual constraints.
3.1. Minority Rights
We define minority rights as descriptive representation
of minorities in the political system, that is, the absence
4 This positive view, however, is not shared by all authors (e.g., Müller, 2016). After all, any new party in opposition is likely to mobilize new voters and
critique established political actors, possibly increasing accountability. Thus, these byproducts can be positive but are not necessarily a function of
populism (Huber & Schimpf, 2016a, p. 109).
5 Between these two types, we can also observe a third category. Havlík and Stanley (2015) write that some populist parties are non-ideological because
their positions on economy issues and the common GAL/TAN scales are too fuzzy with various mutually inconsistent policy proposals. They therefore
refer to these parties as centrist populist. We take an empirical approach to this matter and add this third category when assigning parties the label
of left-wing and right-wing parties in our operationalization. It allows us to avoid categorizing parties as left or right when their proposals are too
incoherent. We return to this point in our research strategy section.
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of systemic exclusion of groups considered minorities
from exercising central power or other political rights
(Merkel et al., 2016).
Here, we expect the populist element to interactwith
the host ideology. As written above, left-wing populist
parties typically consider ethnic minorities as part of the
people and hence, demand equal rights as part of their
socially egalitarian tradition. In Europe as in Latin Amer-
ica, left-wing populist parties tend to be inclusive. In
contrast, right-wing populist parties tend to be exclusive
(Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013), particularly in gov-
ernment where they have a lower incentive to reach out
tominorities as part of a vote-maximizing campaign strat-
egy. March (2011, p. 134), for example, shows that the
left-wing Scottish Socialist Party (SSP) and the allied Re-
spect coalition raised awareness about theMuslim popu-
lation in the United Kingdom and initiated a pro-Muslim
discourse. In contrast, the Slovak National Party (SNS)
routinely targeted Hungarian minority parties and went
as far as to propose a ban of all ethnic parties in Slovakia
(Koev, 2015, p. 652).
H1. The presence of left-wing populist parties is posi-
tively associated with minority rights, whereas the pres-
ence of right-wing populist parties relates negatively to
minority rights.
3.2. Mutual Constraints
Mutual constraints inhibit absolute power in a democ-
racy by balancing the power of the executive vis-à-vis the
judiciary and the legislature (Plattner, 2010).
In contrast to minority rights, where the host ideol-
ogy is central, we argue that in the case of mutual con-
straints, the populist element determines the direction
of the relationship. The strong focus of populist parties
on the people can delegitimize the indirect aggregation
of the volonté générale via the representative system.On
the one hand, populist parties demand either stronger
or more frequently employed measures of direct democ-
racy to ease the implementation of the general will. On
the other hand, if populist parties enter government,
they see no need for a check on power, as they repre-
sent the peoples’ will (Mudde&Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012).
One such example is the attempt by the Polish Law and
Justice Party (PiS), which assumed governmental power
in 2015, to reform the Polish Supreme Court. Among the
proposed changes, was the suggestion that judgeswould
be appointed by the National Council of the Judiciary in
which half the members would also be members of the
parliament, effectively weakening the court’s power to
oversee political decisions (Walsh, 2017). And although
the law was partially rejected by Poland’s President An-
drzej Duda at first, Poland’s Premier Beata Szydlo (PiS)
in reaction to the rejection said that, just like the parlia-
ment, the court should be under the control of the peo-
ple (Waldoch, Krajweski, & Bartyzel, 2017).
This association does not depend upon the host ide-
ology. Most populist parties regularly call for changes to
the constitution to empower the executive. Parties on
the left, such as Fico’s Smer in Slovakia (Malová & Učeň,
2010), have voiced similar demands to those on the
right, for example, Haider’s Austrian Freedom Party (Aus-
trian Freedom Party, 2011; Fallend, 2012) and the Czech
Rally for the Republic/Republican Party of Czechoslo-
vakia (Hanley, 2012). Each of them has demanded more
power for the ruling executive to shift power away from
parliaments and courts. Since the volonté générale is the
rationale for decisions made and actions were taken by
all populist parties here, we expect no differences among
them regarding their influence on mutual constraints.
H2. The presence of populist parties is negatively asso-
ciated with mutual constraints, regardless of the parties’
host ideology.
4. Research Strategy
To test our theoretical arguments, we use a twofold strat-
egy. First, we assess the differences between populist
parties in government and opposition. Second, we dis-
tinguish between left-wing, center and right-wing pop-
ulism to investigate the expected associations with mi-
nority rights and mutual constraints.
Empirically, we use a pooled cross-sectional design.
Since we use the role within a political system as well
as a party’s host ideology, we opted for cabinets as the
temporal unit of analysis. This approach allows us to
determine whether a party is in government or opposi-
tion with great precision, while other approaches such
as country-years are considerably more imprecise. Our
data includes information from 30 European countries
between 1990 and 2012.6 This time span captures ma-
jor events for European populist parties, from their es-
tablishment through their rise. We exclude cabinets with
duration of fewer than six months as we assume that any
measurable impact is only evident after some time.
4.1. Dependent Variable
To measure democratic quality based on our concept of
liberal democracy, we draw on three different sources.
We measure aggregated liberal democratic quality by us-
ing the liberal democracy score (v2x_libdem) of the Va-
rieties of Democracy Project (Coppedge et al., 2011).7
To capture the two subdimensions, mutual constraints,
and minority rights, we rely on the Democracy Barom-
eter. For mutual constraints, we use the aggregated di-
6 We chose 2012 as our cut-off point as data for most of our most dependent variables was not available beyond that year at the time of the data
collection. For an overview of all countries included, see Table A1 in the Appendix A.
7 In order to ease presentation, we multiplied the v2x_libdem by 100. This makes the results comparable to the Democracy Barometer which usually
applies scales ranging from 0 to 100.
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mension of horizontal checks (MC_CHECKS,Merkel et al.,
2016, p. 29) which measures the balance between ex-
ecutive and legislative (ratio of parliamentary seats con-
trolled by government to parliamentary seats controlled
by opposition), the balance of checks between executive
and legislative (ratio of control instruments of legislative
over executive to control instruments of executive over
legislative), and the power of judicial branch to review
political decisions.8 This measure taps into the checks-
and-balances aspect. For minority rights, we use an in-
dicator for the effective access to power for minorities
(REP_DR3, Merkel et al., 2016, p. 53) that measures the
descriptive representation of minorities and the extent
to which they have access to central power.
4.2. Independent Variables
For testing our hypotheses, we use dummies to i) cap-
ture the presence of populist parties in opposition and
government and ii) to capture either the presence of
left-wing or right-wing populist parties. We further use
a middle category for ambivalent cases that would not
fit either of the right- or left-wing categories based on
our coding procedure, which followed a three-step ap-
proach. First, we surveyed the existing secondary litera-
ture on populist parties in Europe to categorize parties in
populist and non-populist parties.9 In the next step, we
determined the role of populist parties in the political
system, applying the following coding scheme: populist
parties in government had to hold some position in the
cabinet and populist parties in opposition had to hold at
least one seat in the national parliament. Thus, we ex-
cluded parties identified as populist but without a seat
in parliament during the relevant cabinet from our anal-
yses. Table A1 in Appendix A lists all parties analyzed.
Finally, to determine whether a populist party be-
longs to one of our three categories (left, right, cen-
ter), we code populist parties in relation to their country-
specific party system. The procedure is the following.
First, we calculate a weighted party system’s ideology
mean for each cabinet. This average takes into consider-
ation the ideological positions of all parliamentary par-
ties in one particular country. We use the seat share of
the respective parties to weight the mean. For each cabi-
net, we then classify populist parties as left, right, or cen-
ter according to their relative distance to this weighted
mean.We code every populist partywithin oneweighted
standard deviation of this reference as centrist, while
parties further to the left or right are coded respectively
(also see Huber & Ruth, 2017).10
4.3. Control Variables
In addition to our central variables, we include a selected
set of covariates that, in theory, may relate to both the
presence of populist parties as well as the levels of our
democratic measures. These variables are the level of
democratic consolidation (time in years since democrati-
zation), cabinet duration (in years), cabinet composition
(surplus governments, minimal winning coalitions, and
minority governments), economic development (GDP
per Capita in 1,000 US Dollar), and a dichotomous vari-
able to distinguish between post-communist countries
and other countries. A detailed rationale for the inclusion
of these variables can be found in Appendix C.
4.4. Empirical Model
To control for country-specific effects, we apply a linear
mixed-effects model with cabinets nested under each
country (Gelman & Hill, 2007).11 The respective coun-
tries serve as groups. This particular model also allows
us to compare both intra- and cross-country variance.
Given our interest in the change in democratic quality as
a consequence of the presence of populist parties, mod-
eling intra-country variance allows us to approximate this
process.12
5. Empirical Results
In Figure 1, we plot the coefficients from the results.13
To start with the aggregatemeasure of liberal democ-
racy (left panel in Figure 1), we observe that in Europe,
there is no general association between populist par-
ties and democracy, independent of their status (gov-
ernment or opposition). While we find the anticipated
direction of correlation, that is negative for populists in
government and positive for those actors in opposition,
they are not statistically significant. However, a different
picture emerges when distinguishing populist parties ac-
cording to their host ideology. First, we see that right-
wing populist parties are associated with lower levels of
8 An extension of this instrument also measures vertical checks, i.e. the degree of federalism and subnational fiscal autonomy. We did not include these
in our central analyses given the focus on political contestation and power checks. However, we did include them in a robust check (see Appendix B).
The substantial results are robust.
9 We base our case selection on Mudde (2007), Arter (2010), March (2011) and Van Kessel (2015), all of whom rely to a great extent on the Mudde
(2004) definition of populism we have adopted here. Following these authors, we also considered changes in a party’s level of populism. For example,
the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) was considered populist prior to Simitis becoming the party’s leader in 1996 (March, 2011). However,
thereafter it took a different course. PASOK was thus only coded as populist up until 1996.
10 We illustrate this, using the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria. Since Haider took over the party in 1986, the FPÖ has been classified as populist
(seeMudde, 2007). They held a position in government in the cabinet Schuessel I (February 4, 2000–February 28, 2003), and for this period, were coded
as “populist in government”. In a next step, we calculate the party systems mean for the period of the cabinet, which is 5.7 on a ten-point scale for
Schuessel I. All parties within one standard deviation of the mean (2.1 [3.6 to 7.8]) are coded as central. Because the FPÖ was coded as 8.3 by ParlGov,
it is coded as “right-wing populist in government” for the cabinet period of Schuessel I.
11 A comparison between Null and Empty model (see Table A3 in Appendix A) suggests using hierarchical models.
12 Table A2 in Appendix A shows descriptive statistics for all variables.
13 For the full regression output in table format, see Tables B2 and B3 in Appendix B.
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Figure 1. Effect of Populism on Liberal Democracy and two Subdimensions (Minority Rights andMutual Constraints). Notes:
Gov = Populist Party in Government (Reference: No Populist Party in Government); Opp = Populist Party in Opposition
(Reference: No Populist Party in Opposition); R = Right-Wing Populist Party present (Reference: No Right-Wing Populist
Party present); C = Centrist Populist Party present (Reference: No Centrist Populist Party present); L = Left-Wing Populist
Party present (Reference: No Left-Wing Populist Party present); Coefficients are plotted with 90% Confidence Intervals
quality of liberal democracy. Second, both center and
left-wing populist parties are associated with higher lev-
els of quality of liberal democracy. Third, while the center
and left-wing populist parties are statistically different
from right-wing populist parties, there is no significant
difference between those two categories. These findings
provide a first idea about potential differences in the
association between populist parties and liberal democ-
racy as a consequence of varying host ideologies. For a
detailed look, we now turn to the results from the two
subdimensions, minority rights, and mutual constraints.
From the middle panel in Figure 1, we can first ob-
serve that populist parties in government are not as-
sociated with any particular direction regarding minor-
ity rights. In contrast, populist parties in opposition are
associated with a positive development. Upon taking
into consideration host ideology, however, we find that
this does not apply to all populists equally. For minor-
ity rights, we expected a more negative effect of right-
wing populist parties and a positive influence of left-wing
populist parties, both in comparison to the absence of
populist parties. The empirical results lend support to
our argument. First, on average we observe a substan-
tial positive relationship between left-wing populist par-
ties andminority rights, whereaswe find negative effects
for right-wing populist parties. The presence of centrist
populist parties is neither negatively nor positively corre-
lated with minority rights.
For mutual constraints, we expected no differences
between the different type of populist parties but on av-
erage, small negative associations for all of them. Figure
1 confirms these expectations. We observe no system-
atic effect of a populist parties’ host ideology. However,
populist parties in government and opposition are neg-
atively associated with mutual constraints compared to
instances where no populist parties are in government
or opposition. This effect is in line with our expectation
that populists undermine the separation of power.14
We conducted two types of robustness checks. First,
we reran our analysis using a continuous variable that
measures the logged seat share of populist parties in-
stead of dummies (See Tables B9 and B10 in the Ap-
pendix).15 Second, we used alternative model specifica-
tions (lagged dependent variablemodels—See Tables B5,
B6 and B7 in the Appendix).16 The most consistent find-
ing across these additional checks is the positive asso-
ciation between left-wing populist parties and minority
rights in comparison to right-wing populist parties, par-
ticularly in opposition.17 Other findings, such as populist
parties’ relationship with mutual constraints, are less
consistent as they aremetwith greater uncertainty in our
statistical models. Overall, these findings further support
our idea that substantive differences in the relationship
between populist parties can arise from host ideologies.
14 Figure B2 in Appendix B includes all combinations of host ideology and government status, which leaves us with six dummies. Substantially, it confirms
the findings of Figure 1.
15 As a logarithm of zero (“0”) is not possible, we added 1 to all values to guarantee numeric values, which are necessary to process the data.
16 Results for these and further robustness checks can be found in Appendix B (Figures B3 and B4, Tables B5, B6, B7, B8, B9 and B10).
17 We also ran a third analysis in which we coded parties that were not formally part of a government but supported government parties in parliamentary
elections as “populist parties in government”. This was the case for the Danish People’s Party (2001–2011) and the Dutch Freedom Party (2010–2012).
These results are also included in the Appendix B (Table B8).
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6. Discussion and Conclusion
Populist parties, because of their central ideas of anti-
elitism, the belief in a general will, and their people cen-
trism, challenge some of the commonly accepted rules
of democracy, especially those of liberal democracy (Plat-
tner, 2010). However, a series of studies have identified
not only negative but also positive effects of populist
parties on democratic quality (Canovan, 1999; Mudde &
Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). Largely absent from the debate
surrounding populism and its relationship to democracy,
however, has been the role of host ideologies. This arti-
cle sought to initiate such discussion. We proposed that
the host ideology, focusing on left- and right-wing pop-
ulism, has consequences for how these parties relate to
the dimension of political inclusion and minority rights
in particular. However, we expected the host ideology to
be irrelevant for a populist parties’ association with mu-
tual constraints. The empirical findings lend support in
particular to the first of our propositions. The main take-
away from our article, therefore, is that populism should
not be examined in isolation from its host ideology when
considering the relationship between populist actors and
democracy. This finding, of course, should not diminish
the role populism plays in this relationship, particularly
in the wake of temporary developments in cases such
as Poland and Hungary. In some cases, however, pop-
ulism may matter less or even only constitute as an ad-
ditional qualifier of radical right parties rather than be-
ing a steady feature (cf. Rydgren, 2017). Future studies
thus could explore under which conditions ideology and
populismmay play a greater role for populist parties and
how they relate to specific aspects of democracy, an is-
sue in which fundamental differences in historical lega-
cies between East- and West-Europe may well play into
(Gherghina & Soare, 2013). Furthermore, right-wing pop-
ulist parties have been shown to mobilize certain voter
groups which have been neglected by other political par-
ties, such as citizens who are lower educated or poor
(e.g., Huber & Ruth, 2017; Rooduijn, 2017). At the same
time, they may also discourage certain voters from turn-
ing out in elections (Immerzeel & Pickup, 2015). Future
research, by focusing on the dimension of political par-
ticipation, may therefore also explore whether left-wing
populist parties exert similar effects or, whether mobi-
lization and de-mobilization effects depend on a populist
party’s host ideology.
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Appendix
Appendix A. Descriptive Information
Table A1. List of populist parties in dataset.
C Party Populists Host Ideology
AT Freedom Party Austria (FPÖ) since 1986 R
AT Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) since 2005 R
BE Flemish Block (VB) 1979–2004 R
BE Flemish Interest (VB) since 2004 R
BE National Front (FNb) 1985–2012 R
BE List Dedecker (LDD) 2007–2010 C
BG Attack (Ataka) since 2005 C
BG Law, Order and Justice (PPS) 2009–2013 R
BG National Movement Simeon the Second (NDSV) 2001–2005 C
BG Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) since 2009 C (2009)
HR Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) since 1989 C
HR Croatian Party of Rights (HSP) since 1990 R
CH Swiss Democrats (SD) since 1961 R
CH Freedom Party of Switzerland (FPS) since 1984 R
CH Swiss People’s Party (SVP) since 1971 R
CH League of Ticinesians (LdT) since 1991 R
CZ Rally for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSC) since 1989 R
CZ Public Affairs (VV) since 2001 C
DK Progress Party (FPd) since 1972 R
DK The Danish People’s Party (DFP) since 1995 R
EE Estonian Citizens (EK) 1992 R
EE Estonian National Independence Party (ERSP) 1988–1995 C
EE Estonian United People’s Party (EUR) 1994–2006 L
FI Finnish Rural Party (SMP) 1959–1995 C
FI Finns Party (PS) since 1995 C
FR National Front (FN) since 1972 R
GE Party for Democratic Socialism (PDS) 1990–2005 L
GE The Left / PDS 2005-2007 L
GE The Left since 2007 L
GR Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) until 1996 C
GR Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) since 2000 R
GR Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) since 2004 L
GR Independent Greeks (AE) since 2012 R
HU Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP) since 1993 R
HU Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ) since 2006 R (2006), C(2010)
IR Sinn Féin (SF) since 1970 L
IT Lega Nord (LN) since 1991 R (1992, 1996, 2001, 2006,
2008), C (1994, 1996)
IT Come on Italy/ People of Freedom Party (FI-PdL) 1995–2009 C
LV For Fatherland and Freedom (LNNK) 1993–2001 C
LI Young Lithuania (JL) since 1994 R
LI Order and Justice (TT) since 2002 C
LI Labour Party (DP) since 2003 C (2004), L (2008)
LU Alternative Democratic Reform (AR|ADR) since 2004 R
NL Party for Freedom (PVV) since 2006 R
NL Socialist Party (SP) Until 2008 L
NL The List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) 2002–2006 R
NL Liveable Netherlands (LN) 2002–2003 R
NO Progress Party (FrP) since 1973 R
PL Law and Justice (Pis) since 2001 C (2005, 2007), R (2011)
PL League of Polish Families (LPR) since 2001 R
Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 4, Pages 146–165 155
Table A1. List of populist parties in dataset. (Cont.)
C Party Populists Host Ideology
PL Self-Defense of the Republic Poland (SRP) since 1992 C (2001), L(2005)
RO Greater Romania Party (PRM) since 1991 R
RO Romanian National Unity Party (PUNR) 1990–2006 C
RO Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR) 1993–2001 L (1992, 1996), C (2000)
RO People’s Party-Dan Diaconescu (PP-DD) 2011–2015 L
SK Slovak National Party (SNS) since 1989 C (1990, 1998, 2002, 2006,
2010), R (1992, 1994)
SK Party of Civic Understanding (SOP) 1998–2003 L
SK Smer (Direction), the Third Way 1999–2005 L
SK Smer (Direction), Social Democracy since 2005 L (2006, 2010), C (2012)
SK Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) 2002–2012 C
SK Ordinary People and Independent Personalities Party (OLaNO) since 2011 R
SL Slovenian National Party (SNS) since 1991 C
SE New Democracy (NyD) 1991–2000 R
SE Sweden Democrats (SD) since 1988 R
UK Sinn Féin (SF) 1905–today L
Note: Sources for these parties are Mudde (2007), Arter (2010), March (2011) and Van Kessel (2015). We should note that the Progress
Party (FPd) in Demark and the Swedish party New Democracy (NyD) are borderline cases for that they may fit the category of neoliberal
populist parties better. This is the case, as Mudde (2007, p. 48) writes, because “their xenophobic rhetoric is primarily informed by their
liberalism”. We kept these parties in our analyses nonetheless as a) they still fit the category of populist parties and b) would only be
relevant for the analyses of minority rights in which case our results are more conservative given the inclusion of two cases that do not
share the strong focus on nativism with other cases included here.
Table A2. Descriptive statistics.
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Liberal Democracy (VDem) 255 78.56 19.83 –37.32 190.36
Liberal Democracy (UDS) 265 11.34 10.45 –10.10 112.25
Liberal Democracy (DB) 255 56.44 17.53 –39.60 174.48
Minority Rights 270 61.94 31.00 1−5.56 100.00
Mutual Constraints 269 70.00 12.73 –39.72 193.99
Robustness Check: Mutual Constraints 259 46.45 19.42 –28.15 175.41
Government 270 10.13 10.34 –10 111
Opposition 270 10.53 10.50 –10 111
Right 270 10.35 10.48 –10 111
Center 270 10.24 10.43 –10 111
Left 270 10.14 10.35 –10 111
Right Government 270 10.05 10.22 –10 111
Right Opposition 270 10.32 10.47 –10 111
Center Government 270 10.08 10.27 –10 111
Center Opposition 270 10.17 10.38 –10 111
Left Government 270 10.02 10.15 –10 111
Left Opposition 270 10.12 10.33 –10 111
Democratic Consolidation 263 32.95 32.47 –10 161
Cabinet Duration 270 26.79 15.23 –16 161
Government Type (surplus) 270 10.22 10.41 –10 111
Economic Development 270 21.49 15.95 –12.48 183.41
Post-Communist Country 270 10.46 10.50 –10 111
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Table A3. Comparison of empty and null model using VDem.
Model AIC BIC logLik L.Ratio p-value
Null 1891.3 1898.4 –943.6
Empty 1362.2 1372.8 –678.1 531.1 <.0001
Appendix B. Additional Regression Figures and Tables and Robustness Checks (RBC)
The table below provides an overview of all abbreviations used for the various populist party dummies in the Appendix
included in the models, their meaning (when coded as “1”), and the reference category (when coded as “0”).
Table B1. Abbreviations of populist party dummies, meaning and reference categories.
Abbreviation Meaning Reference Group
Gov Populist Party in Government No Populist Party in Government
Opp Populist Party in Opposition No Populist Party in Opposition
R Right-Wing Populist Party Present No Right-Wing Populist Party Present
C Centrist Populist Party Present No Centrist Populist Party Present
L Left-Wing Populist Party Present No Left-Wing Populist Party Present
RG Right-Wing Populist Party in Government No Right-Wing Populist Party in Government
RO Right-Wing Populist Party in Opposition No Right-Wing Populist Party in Opposition
CG Centrist Populist Party in Government No Centrist Populist Party in Government
CO Centrist Populist Party in Opposition No Centrist Populist Party in Opposition
LG Left-Wing Populist Party in Government No Left-Wing Populist Party in Government
LO Left-Wing Populist Party in Opposition No Left-Wing Populist Party in Opposition
L
C
R
Gov
Opp
–0.10 0.15
UDS
–0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 –5.0
Mutual
Constraints
–2.5 0.0 2.5
VDem
–2 –1 0 1 2
Democracy
Barometer
–1 0 1
Minority
Rights
–5 0 5 10
Robustness:
Mutual
Constraints
–2 –1 0 1
Coeﬃcients
Figure B1. Effect of populism on liberal democracy subdimensions (regression results: Tables B2 and B3). Note: Figure B1
additionally includes two more measures of liberal democracy by the UDS (Pemstein, 2010) and Democracy Barometer
(Merkel et al., 2016)
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–2.5 0.0 2.5 5.0
UDS
–0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
Democracy
Barometer
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Figure B2. Effect of populismon liberal democracy subdimensions by combinations of host ideology and government status
(regression results: Table B4). Note: Figure B2 disentangles combinations of both government status and host ideology.
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Figure B3. RBC—Effect of populism on liberal democracy subdimensions using a lagged dependent variable (regression
results: Tables B5 and B6).
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Figure B4. RBC–effect of populism on liberal democracy subdimensions by combinations of host ideology and government
status using a lagged dependent variable (regression results: Table B7).
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Table B2. Populism and liberal democracy by government status.
VDem UDS DB Minority Mutual Robustness CheckRights Constraints Mutual Constraints
Government −0.30 −0.002 0.26 2.52 −2.70** −1.56**
(0.48) (0.04) (0.45) (1.85) (1.34) (0.73)
Opposition 0.21 0.05* 0.62* 3.39** −2.19** −1.20**
(0.39) (0.03) (0.35) (1.51) (1.10) (0.59)
Democratic Consolidation 0.19*** 0.003** 0.002 0.40*** 0.13* 0.18***
(0.03) (0.002) (0.03) (0.11) (0.07) (0.04)
Cabinet Duration 0.01 0.002* 0.02 0.08* 0.04 0.02
(0.01) (0.001) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Government Type (surplus) 0.19 0.02 −0.56 1.24 1.87* 1.61***
(0.40) (0.03) (0.36) (1.56) (1.13) (0.60)
Economic Development −0.03 0.01* 0.10** −0.30 −0.05 −0.06
(0.06) (0.003) (0.04) (0.19) (0.12) (0.07)
Post-Communist Country 1.50 −0.35*** −5.65** −23.57** 11.41* 2.39
(3.59) (0.11) (2.47) (10.81) (5.71) (4.66)
Constant 71.73*** 1.21*** 55.97*** 62.91*** 62.22*** 41.18***
(2.53) (0.10) (1.74) (7.77) (4.51) (3.20)
Observations 251 263 251 263 262 255
Log Likelihood −616.74 18.28 −578.01 −987.48 −892.15 −721.81
AIC 1,253.49 −16.57 1,176.02 1,994.96 1,804.30 1,463.62
BIC 1,288.42 18.84 1,210.95 2,030.37 1,839.67 1,498.72
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table B3. Populism and liberal democracy by host ideology.
VDem UDS DB Minority Mutual Robustness CheckRights Constraints Mutual Constraints
Right −1.39*** −0.04 −0.81** −4.22*** −1.63 −0.56
(0.42) (0.03) (0.39) (1.59) (1.21) (0.69)
Center 0.75* 0.05 0.82** 1.94 −1.55 −0.38
(0.41) (0.03) (0.39) (1.61) (1.22) (0.67)
Left 1.71*** 0.07* −0.12 8.99*** 0.03 −0.11
(0.54) (0.04) (0.53) (2.05) (1.55) (0.88)
Democratic Consolidation 0.19*** 0.003** 0.003 0.42*** 0.14* 0.17***
(0.03) (0.002) (0.03) (0.11) (0.07) (0.05)
Cabinet Duration 0.01 0.001 0.01 0.08** 0.03 0.01
(0.01) (0.001) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Government Type (surplus) −0.16 0.002 −0.69* 0.37 1.67 1.47**
(0.39) (0.03) (0.36) (1.51) (1.15) (0.62)
Economic Development −0.06 0.005 0.11*** −0.39** −0.06 −0.07
(0.06) (0.003) (0.04) (0.18) (0.13) (0.07)
Post-Communist Country 0.68 −0.36*** −5.45** −25.18** 11.36* 2.03
(3.59) (0.12) (2.52) (10.90) (5.87) (4.64)
Constant 72.91*** 1.24*** 56.12*** 66.99*** 61.94*** 41.17***
(2.51) (0.11) (1.76) (7.76) (4.63) (3.21)
Observations 251 263 251 263 262 255
Log Likelihood −605.24 17.84 −575.31 −975.35 −892.49 −724.25
AIC. 1,232.48 −13.68 1,172.61 1,972.70 1,806.99 1,470.50
BIC 1,270.85 25.23 1,210.99 2,011.61 1,845.85 1,509.06
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table B4. Populism and liberal democracy by combinations of host ideology and government status.
VDem UDS DB Minority Mutual Robustness CheckRights Constraints Mutual Constraints
Right Government −2.51*** −0.20*** −2.58*** −9.15*** −0.80 −0.46
(0.86) (0.07) (0.88) (3.34) (2.55) (1.52)
Center Government −0.04 0.03 0.91* 1.87 −2.22 −1.24
(0.52) (0.04) (0.50) (2.05) (1.57) (0.86)
Left Government 3.24*** 0.28*** 0.33 13.40*** 1.50 1.67
(1.01) (0.08) (1.45) (3.91) (3.01) (1.97)
Right Opposition −1.12*** −0.04 −0.60 −3.50** −2.51** −1.00
(0.42) (0.03) (0.39) (1.59) (1.22) (0.68)
Center Opposition 0.52 0.03 0.38 1.79 −0.67 −0.14
(0.50) (0.04) (0.49) (1.96) (1.49) (0.84)
Left Opposition 1.34** 0.02 −0.06 7.68*** −0.53 −0.48
(0.58) (0.05) (0.56) (2.23) (1.69) (0.95)
Democratic Consolidation 0.21*** 0.004** 0.01 0.44*** 0.14* 0.18***
(0.03) (0.002) (0.03) (0.11) (0.07) (0.05)
Cabinet Duration 0.02 0.002* 0.02* 0.09** 0.03 0.02
(0.01) (0.001) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Government Type (surplus) −0.19 −0.01 −0.54 0.26 1.36 1.30**
(0.40) (0.03) (0.36) (1.55) (1.18) (0.63)
Economic Development −0.07 0.005 0.10** −0.40** −0.06 −0.07
(0.06) (0.003) (0.04) (0.18) (0.13) (0.07)
Post-Communist Country 0.95 −0.34*** −5.31** −24.96** 11.25* 2.31
(3.62) (0.12) (2.54) (10.78) (5.81) (4.70)
Constant 72.52*** 1.22*** 55.82*** 66.11*** 62.33*** 41.05***
(2.53) (0.11) (1.78) (7.71) (4.62) (3.25)
Observations 251 263 251 263 262 255
Log Likelihood −601.04 19.31 −570.74 −966.41 −885.56 −718.38
AIC. 1,230.09 −10.62 1,169.48 1,960.82 1,799.12 1,464.75
BIC 1,278.76 38.74 1,218.15 2,010.18 1,848.42 1,513.65
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table B5. RBC–association of populist parties with democratic quality by government status (lagged dependent variable
model).
VDem UDS DB Minority Mutual Robustness CheckRights Constraints Mutual Constraints
Government −0.20 −0.02 −0.41 2.18* −1.22 −0.36
(0.37) (0.03) (0.31) (1.31) (1.27) (0.68)
Opposition 0.0000 0.0003 0.25 2.40*** −1.25 −0.53
(0.27) (0.02) (0.21) (0.91) (0.89) (0.48)
Democratic Consolidation 0.01 0.0001 0.005 −0.03 −0.02 0.003
(0.01) (0.0005) (0.005) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Cabinet Duration 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.02 0.03 0.02
(0.01) (0.001) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Government Type (surplus) 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.64 0.70 0.51
(0.30) (0.02) (0.24) (1.07) (1.06) (0.57)
Economic Development −0.001 0.003** 0.003 −0.01 −0.005 0.01
(0.02) (0.001) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Post-Communist Country 0.36 −0.01 0.26 −1.84 0.17 0.18
(0.44) (0.04) (0.32) (1.47) (1.45) (0.75)
Lagged DV 0.96*** 0.82*** 0.96*** 0.96*** 0.81*** 0.94***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 3.21*** 0.17*** 2.22** 3.06 14.34*** 2.56*
(1.14) (0.06) (0.99) (1.92) (3.23) (1.40)
Observations 243 253 237 249 249 242
Adjusted R2 0.96 0.88 0.96 0.95 0.74 0.88
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table B6. RBC–association of populist parties with democratic quality by host ideology (lagged dependent variablemodel).
VDem UDS DB Minority Mutual Robustness CheckRights Constraints Mutual Constraints
Right −0.32 −0.03 −0.13 0.11 −0.44 −0.01
(0.28) (0.02) (0.22) (0.93) (0.91) (0.48)
Center −0.23 0.02 −0.04 0.30 −0.70 −0.48
(0.29) (0.02) (0.25) (1.05) (1.03) (0.55)
Left 0.35 −0.01 −0.06 2.84** −0.50 0.12
(0.33) (0.03) (0.30) (1.20) (1.17) (0.63)
Democratic Consolidation 0.004 0.0001 0.004 −0.02 −0.03 0.0004
(0.01) (0.0005) (0.005) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Cabinet Duration 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.02 0.03 0.02
(0.01) (0.001) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Government Type (surplus) 0.13 0.03 0.04 1.30 0.60 0.59
(0.30) (0.03) (0.26) (1.12) (1.10) (0.59)
Economic Development 0.01 0.003*** 0.01 0.02 −0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.001) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Post-Communist Country 0.46 −0.01 0.36 −0.81 −0.29 −0.06
(0.43) (0.03) (0.32) (1.45) (1.42) (0.73)
Lagged DV 0.96*** 0.82*** 0.96*** 0.96*** 0.81*** 0.93***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 3.48*** 0.17*** 1.85 2.79 14.57*** 2.89**
(1.15) (0.06) (0.99) (1.93) (3.26) (1.41)
Observations 243 253 237 249 249 242
Adjusted R2 0.96 0.88 0.96 0.95 0.74 0.87
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table B7. RBC–association of populist parties with democratic quality by combinations of host ideology and government
status (lagged dependent variable model).
VDem UDS DB Minority Mutual Robustness CheckRights Constraints Mutual Constraints
Right Government −0.34 −0.05 −0.24 0.41 0.91 1.11
(0.60) (0.05) (0.55) (2.27) (2.17) (1.29)
Center Government −0.88** −0.01 −0.67* −0.28 −1.55 −0.97
(0.43) (0.04) (0.38) (1.61) (1.56) (0.84)
Left Government 2.28*** 0.05 0.82 2.74 2.53 1.83
(0.80) (0.07) (1.58) (2.93) (2.87) (1.86)
Right Opposition −0.34 −0.03 −0.05 0.15 −1.13 −0.27
(0.28) (0.02) (0.22) (0.96) (0.94) (0.50)
Center Opposition −0.20 0.02 0.10 0.85 −0.95 −0.58
(0.33) (0.03) (0.29) (1.24) (1.22) (0.65)
Left Opposition −0.03 −0.02 −0.10 2.85** −1.07 −0.09
(0.36) (0.03) (0.30) (1.33) (1.28) (0.69)
Democratic Consolidation 0.01 0.0003 0.005 −0.02 −0.03 −0.002
(0.01) (0.001) (0.005) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Cabinet Duration 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.001) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Government Type (surplus) −0.03 0.02 0.05 1.11 0.35 0.45
(0.31) (0.03) (0.26) (1.18) (1.14) (0.61)
Economic Development 0.002 0.003** 0.005 0.01 −0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.001) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Post-Communist Country 0.39 −0.01 0.33 −0.96 −0.21 −0.08
(0.43) (0.03) (0.32) (1.48) (1.44) (0.75)
Lagged DV 0.96*** 0.82*** 0.96*** 0.96*** 0.82*** 0.93***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Constant 3.16*** 0.17*** 2.12** 2.97 14.69*** 3.15**
(1.14) (0.06) (1.01) (1.98) (3.34) (1.52)
Observations 243 253 237 249 249 242
Adjusted R2 0.96 0.88 0.96 0.95 0.74 0.88
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table B8. RBC–populism and liberal democracy by government status using alternative coding (see notes below the table).
VDem UDS DB Minority Mutual Robustness CheckRights Constraints Mutual Constraints
Government −0.41 −0.004 0.37 2.38 −3.08** −1.81***
(0.45) (0.04) (0.42) (1.76) (1.27) (0.69)
Opposition 0.28 0.05* 0.56 3.47** −1.96* −1.05*
(0.38) (0.03) (0.34) (1.46) (1.06) (0.57)
Democratic Consolidation 0.19*** 0.003** 0.001 0.41*** 0.13* 0.18***
(0.03) (0.002) (0.03) (0.11) (0.07) (0.05)
Cabinet Duration 0.01 0.001* 0.01 0.08* 0.04 0.02
(0.01) (0.001) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Government Type (surplus) 0.20 0.01 −0.57 1.24 1.90* 1.63***
(0.40) (0.03) (0.36) (1.56) (1.12) (0.60)
Economic Development −0.03 0.01* 0.10** −0.30 −0.05 −0.07
(0.06) (0.003) (0.04) (0.19) (0.12) (0.07)
Post-Communist Country 1.60 −0.35*** −5.62** −23.45** 11.55* 2.47
(3.60) (0.11) (2.47) (10.82) (5.73) (4.67)
Constant 71.59*** 1.21*** 55.95*** 62.73*** 61.99*** 41.05***
(2.54) (0.10) (1.74) (7.79) (4.53) (3.20)
Observations 251 263 251 263 262 255
Log Likelihood −616.35 18.41 −578.27 −987.51 −892.00 −721.55
AIC 1,252.71 −16.83 1,176.54 1,995.02 1,804.00 1,463.09
BIC 1,287.64 18.59 1,211.47 2,030.44 1,839.37 1,498.19
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
For this robustness check, we recoded two cases where populist parties supportedminority governments. These two cases
were the Danish Peoples Party from 2001 to 2011 and the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV) from 2010 to 2012.
Table B9. Populism and liberal democracy by government status using seat share.
VDem UDS DB Minority Mutual Robustness CheckRights Constraints Mutual Constraints
Government 0.62 0.16 0.40 8.91 0.42 −0.09
(1.82) (0.15) (1.65) (7.06) (5.14) (2.86)
Opposition 1.94 0.35** −2.04 18.53** −5.08 −1.50
(2.07) (0.17) (1.90) (8.03) (5.86) (3.30)
Democratic Consolidation 0.18*** 0.003* 0.01 0.35*** 0.12 0.17***
(0.03) (0.002) (0.03) (0.12) (0.07) (0.05)
Cabinet Duration 0.01 0.001* 0.02 0.08* 0.03 0.01
(0.01) (0.001) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Government Type (surplus) 0.20 0.02 −0.58 2.00 1.38 1.40**
(0.40) (0.03) (0.36) (1.55) (1.13) (0.61)
Economic Development −0.02 0.01* 0.11** −0.24 −0.05 −0.06
(0.06) (0.003) (0.04) (0.19) (0.12) (0.07)
Post-Communist Country 1.25 −0.37*** −0.19** −24.56** 10.62* 1.80
(3.59) (0.11) (2.49) (10.68) (5.81) (4.61)
Constant 71.92*** 1.23*** 55.87*** 64.46*** 62.05*** 41.21***
(2.53) (0.10) (1.76) (7.72) (4.58) (3.19)
Observations 251 263 251 263 262 255
Log Likelihood −613.73 22.18 −575.95 −984.76 −892.25 −722.53
AIC 1,247.45 −24.35 1,171.89 1,989.51 1,804.50 1,465.05
BIC 1,282.38 11.06 1,206.82 2,024.93 1,839.87 1,500.15
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table B10. Populism and liberal democracy by host ideology using seat share.
VDem UDS DB Minority Mutual Robustness CheckRights Constraints Mutual Constraints
Right −7.94** 0.03 −5.72* −5.42 0.36 1.57
(3.32) (0.27) (3.03) (13.20) (9.84) (5.33)
Center 1.16 0.16 1.42 9.30 −2.23 −0.86
(1.74) (0.14) (1.60) (6.98) (5.19) (2.80)
Left 19.48*** 1.13*** −9.37 62.57*** 0.93 −0.43
(4.60) (0.36) (5.96) (17.80) (13.17) (10.39)
Democratic Consolidation 0.17*** 0.003 0.02 0.33*** 0.11 0.16***
(0.03) (0.002) (0.03) (0.11) (0.07) (0.05)
Cabinet Duration 0.01 0.001 0.01 0.08* 0.03 0.01
(0.01) (0.001) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Government Type (surplus) 0.02 0.02 −0.66* 1.57 1.49 1.46**
(0.38) (0.03) (0.36) (1.54) (1.15) (0.62)
Economic Development −0.02 0.01* 0.11** −0.23 −0.06 −0.07
(0.05) (0.003) (0.04) (0.18) (0.12) (0.07)
Post-Communist Country 0.49 −0.39*** −4.96* −26.19** 10.13* 1.63
(3.50) (0.12) (2.51) (10.62) (5.80) (4.59)
Constant 72.71*** 1.25*** 55.69*** 66.45*** 62.34*** 41.30***
(2.46) (0.10) (1.76) (7.67) (4.60) (3.18)
Observations 251 263 251 263 262 255
Log Likelihood −598.83 25.72 −569.98 −975.75 −888.53 −718.80
AIC 1,219.67 −29.43 1,161.96 1,973.49 1,799.07 1,459.59
BIC 1,258.04 9.48 1,200.34 2,012.40 1,837.93 1,498.15
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Appendix C. Description of Control Variables and Rationale for Inclusion
In our empirical model, we include a set of covariates that may relate to the presence of populist parties as well as to
our democratic measures. This section in the Appendix explains the detailed rationale for the inclusion of each of the con-
trol variables. First, we include democratic consolidation as a control variable. We anticipate that both the existence of
populism as well as the level of democracy might depend on how long a country is democratic. Furthermore, it has been
argued elsewhere that the effect of populists is stronger when democratic institutions are less established (see Huber &
Schimpf, 2016b; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). To capture this logic, we use the time that has passed since democra-
tization in each country was reached (in years) and use data from Polity IV (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2017). Second, we
control for cabinet duration. The shorter a cabinet lasts, the less likely it is that a cabinet can realize its agenda. Third, we
include a measure for cabinet composition. We distinguish between surplus governments and other governments such as
minority or minimal winning coalitions. Albertazzi and Mueller (2013) as well as Huber and Schimpf (2016a) highlight that
this might moderate the effect of populist parties in government. At the same time, long time surplus governments such
as in Austria have been argued to provide fertile grounds for populist’s anti-elite rhetoric. The ParlGov dataset contains
information on, both, the cabinet duration and composition (Doering & Manow, 2015). Fourth, we control for economic
development. Some scholars have argued that populists are especially successful in garnering support from “losers of
globalization” (Kitschelt, 1995, Kriesi et al., 2012). Thus, we anticipate that populist parties might be more successful in
less developed countries. On the other hand, a long-lasting discussion has emerged on whether democracy and economic
circumstances are connected or not (e.g. Boix & Stokes, 2003, Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000). To capture
this, wemeasure economic development withWorldbank data on the gross domestic product per capita (GDPpc) in $1000
to ease interpretation. Finally, we include a dummy for post-communist countries as we anticipate that this distinction
might play a role, both in the existence of different populist parties and levels of democratic quality (Gherghina & Soare,
2013, p. 7).
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